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A B S T R A C T
Documentary practices legitimizing marriage in what
is now Jordan have taken different forms from the
late Ottoman period to the present. I analyze the
formal characteristics and materiality of these
practices to show how initiatives to standardize,
aggregate, and circulate information about marriage
introduce new notions of personhood, state, and
society. Such legitimizing infrastructures entail new
forms of accountability that go beyond and even
challenge the intentions of those who promulgate
such initiatives. The shift in emphasis in Jordan
from oral to written contracts and the subsequent
aggregation and circulation of those records reifies
categories of individual, state, and society while
drawing them into a wide array of gendered,
generational, and political conflicts. Ironically, the
state’s legitimation of marriage may even draw its
own legitimacy into question. [quantification,
legitimacy, the state, personhood, sharia,
bureaucracy, graphic artifacts, circulation]
I
n the summer of 2010, after years of hearing friends and neigh-
bors in Jordan complain about a “crisis of marriage,” I began con-
ducting preliminary fieldwork on this discourse, which quickly led
me to an Islamic charity called “the Chastity Society” (Al-‘Afa¯f).
Dr. Mufid Sarhan, its director, provided me with an armful of pam-
phlets and books his organization had published on the topic, including
didactic texts describing a proper Islamic family life and quantitative anal-
yses of official Sharia Court marriage statistics. He explained that falling
marriage rates were socially disruptive and threatened to draw youths into
illegitimate sexual relations, and he blamed the situation on a combina-
tion of government mismanagement and backward societal expectations
that put marriage out of reach for many. To mitigate the disruptive po-
tential of the crisis, the Chastity Society organized an annual mass wed-
ding as a more efficient and cost-effective alternative to traditional wed-
dings and worked with the Jordan Islamic Bank to dispense millions of di-
nar in interest-free loans to young couples. Led by President Abdul-Latif
Arabiyyat (former head of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood’s political
wing, the Islamic Action Front), the society presented itself as an alterna-
tive to the family and the state, which were rendered deficient in its view
because of their inability to properly channel the sexual relationships of
Jordanian youth. Through its knowledge production and broader activism,
the Chastity Society used the state’s Sharia Court data as evidence of the
state’s failure to legitimate the marriages of its citizens—and, hence, as ev-
idence of the moral inadequacy of the state itself.
While biogenetic relatedness remains important to Arab conceptions of
kinship, the “focus on legitimacy, on being born in wedlock” (2009:16), is,
as Morgan Clarke argues, crucial as well. “Sexual propriety” constitutes “a
material condition with regard to kinship relation” (Clarke 2009:198). In-
creasingly, that means not just enacting the appropriate collective rites for
the social recognition of marriage but also enlisting the help of particu-
lar state-backed bureaucratic technologies. “Technologies of governance”
(Hasso 2011:45) like the marriage contract and the statistical report pro-
duce more than just types of claimants at court and folk theories of the
state. They also produce individual experts, advocacy organizations, and
broader social movements, which help constitute the bureaucratic arena
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as one of contestation. These bureaucratic technologies for
the recognition and legitimation of marriage have emerged
in Jordan in tandem with transformations in notions of per-
sonhood, the state, and society—which are themselves con-
tested through these very technologies.
Legitimacy here is not merely a familial or even a re-
ligious matter because legitimate filiation is still under-
stood to be foundational to all other facets of legitimacy
within Arab societies. The prominence of de facto and de
jure monarchy in the region is relevant here, but the fact
that the Jordanian state claims to derive political legitimacy
from its king’s parentage is far less important in promoting
a cultural focus on legitimacy than more ubiquitous con-
temporary phenomena like inheritance and, of course, cit-
izenship. Jordan and neighboring countries do not grant
citizenship to children simply because they were born in
the country or born to a mother who is a citizen—nor do
they necessarily recognize demands for child support and
alimony in the absence of a marriage contract. As Clarke
and Frances Hasso note, marriage in the region is usually
a prerequisite for mothers’ and children’s right to demand
paternal and state support. Furthermore, Arab states like
Jordan often limit citizenship to the legitimate offspring
of their male citizens, sometimes denying others the right
to own property, get an education, or join a profession.
Clarke (2009:81) illustrates this point when he relates the
claim of some of his Lebanese interlocutors that Pales-
tinian refugees might abandon their children on the steps
of an orphanage because being a parentless Lebanese citi-
zen would be preferable to being the child of stateless Pales-
tinians. Most of Jordan’s two million registered Palestinian
refugees (now joined by half a million Iraqi refugees and
1.4 million registered Syrian refugees) have historically en-
joyed more rights than do refugees in Lebanon. Nonethe-
less, many of the 7.3 million people who now live in Jordan
have experienced statelessness and understand all too well
how fragile citizenship rights can be. Such tenuous citizens
are acutely aware of the serious consequences for future
generations of failing to aggressively legitimate their sexual
relations.
In this article, I consider the historical development of
four distinct technologies for legitimizing marriages: (1) the
oral marriage contract, made and witnessed by a proposal
delegation, (2) contracts recorded in courthouse registers,
(3) form contracts issued by the courthouse to newlyweds’
families, and (4) statistical reports, which aggregate court-
generated data about marriage into annual summaries and
online compendia that are published and cited extensively
by progovernment and dissident intellectuals alike. By
contrasting the routine workings of these procedures with
moments of crisis that reveal the vulnerabilities of various
figures of authority (from family patriarchs to bureaucrats
to “the state” in the abstract), I challenge more credu-
lous accounts of Arab authoritarianism and patriarchy.
Showing how these different legitimizing technologies
have historically built on (but also undermined) each
other provides a unique opportunity to think about the
subtle but important powers of different bureaucratic
artifacts and procedures. Whereas the proposal delegation
emphasizes the collective agency of the extended kin group
as embodied in ritual exchanges among senior males,
written contracts exert an individuating influence and
render family members accountable to the state. Yet, as
such data are standardized through the promulgation of
form marriage contracts, aggregated into official reports,
and circulated in the writings of both progovernment and
dissident intellectuals, the state becomes accountable
to the very “society” it sought to manage when it began
collecting such data about the population in the first
place.
Legitimizing infrastructures
In tracing the development of these technologies, I
emphasize that certain teleological readings would be
unfounded—especially a simple orality-to-literacy narra-
tive (cf. Ong 1982). People in the Mediterranean have been
using written contracts since pre-Islamic times (Sonbol
2008), and many still use oral contracts today. Older arti-
facts and procedures do not necessarily fall away; rather,
new layers are grafted onto the ones that came before.
For instance, after a contemporary marriage contract is
concluded by delegations representing the couple’s respec-
tive families, a court-affiliated notary, the ma’dhu¯n, often
waits in another room to issue a Sharia-compliant mar-
riage contract. Thus, as with other forms of infrastructure,
the information infrastructure that records and legitimates
Jordanian marital arrangements is “built on an installed
base,” presupposing older traditions. As Susan Leigh Star
observes, infrastructure “wrestles with the inertia of the in-
stalled base and inherits strengths and limitations from that
base. Optical fibers run along old railroad lines; new sys-
tems are designed for backwards compatibility, and failing
to account for these constraints may be fatal or distorting
to new development processes” (1999:382). Likewise these
four “legitimizing infrastructures” build on, contest, and
thwart each other.
During fieldwork conducted in Jordan between the
capital of Amman and the provincial town of Madaba
from 2010 to 2012, I studied Sharia Court offices (where I
observed employees officiate over 100 marriage contracts),
the Chastity Society, and various wedding delegations in ur-
ban, rural, and refugee camp contexts. The contradictions
between and within the various legitimizing infrastructures
emerge through the juxtaposition of their idealized work-
ings with ethnographic examples in which the information
infrastructure “breaks down.” Star argues that infrastruc-
ture “becomes visible upon breakdown . . . the server is
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Figure 1. The front of a 1920s-era marriage contract for the Emirate of Transjordan (Geoffrey Hughes).
down, the bridge washes out, there is a power blackout.
Even when there are backup mechanisms or procedures,
their existence further highlights the now-visible infras-
tructure” (1999:382). I use such “breakdowns” to emphasize
notions of personhood, state, and society that are at odds
with the various legitimizing infrastructures. At points, my
arguments are supplemented by a statistical analysis1 of a
representative sample of 377 marriage contracts taken from
the Amman courthouse covering the years 1926–53 (when
the court had jurisdiction over central Jordan, including
Madaba) and a representative sample of 433 contracts
taken from the more recent Madaba courthouse covering
the years 1954–2011. I have also spent time working with
the Jerusalem courthouse registers (1517–1917).2 Both
oral and written contracts are replete with opportunities
for breakdowns. What constitutes a breakdown, however,
differs markedly from one legitimizing infrastructure to the
next in highly consequential ways. (See Figure 1.)
The delegation
For all the diversity I encountered while researching mar-
riage in Jordan, people mostly agreed on which ritual events
constituted a taqlı¯dı¯ (traditional) marriage. These included
an organized proposal delegation, or ja¯ha, followed by
an interval of months or even years and then a multiday
wedding, or ‘urs. Such marriages were arranged, or at least
publicly discussed as if they were arranged. Jordanians
from diverse backgrounds described the delegation to me
in similar, somewhat idealized terms. The groom’s family
would travel to meet with the bride’s family.3 Upon arrival,
the families would separate by gender, and a ritual would
unfold on the men’s side in which the senior male from the
groom’s family would decline the initial offer of coffee from
his host, the bride’s representative. Next, he would express
his family’s desire to “get closer” to the bride’s family by
marrying “what’s her name?” or “your noble daughter.”
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This was intended as the cue for the father of the groom to
offer her name. Then the families would publicly agree to
a bridewealth payment: furniture, gold, and other gifts for
the couple in addition to alimony for the woman in case
of divorce. As the culminating gesture in the pageantry
surrounding the delegation, the representative of the
bride’s family would again offer coffee to the representative
of the groom’s family. By drinking the cup of coffee, the
representative of the groom’s family would seal the agree-
ment and form a new bond between the two groups. After
those assembled recited the opening verses of the Quran,
coffee would be served to all the attendees, followed by tea,
Pepsi, and sweets. Ululation would erupt in the imh. arem
(the women’s area). When the delegation was finished, the
groom’s family would file out, shaking the hands of the
bride’s family once again, and return home—sometimes to
the sound of celebratory gunfire.
The delegation involves a complex distribution of cog-
nition, agency, and personhood that does not lend itself
to description in terms of “the state,” “society,” or “the
individual.”4 Because of the potential for embarrassment
and the generally h. urma (protected) status accorded to
women, no individual person completely comprehends the
situation. As an unmarried male anthropologist, I expe-
rienced an exaggerated form of the many cognitive chal-
lenges faced by my Jordanian interlocutors (particularly
other men) as I attempted to interpret the events unfolding
around me. Women’s marriage negotiations generally hap-
pened in intimate family spaces that I rarely visited. Fur-
thermore, consistent with my desire to be hypercorrect, I
tended to avoid using women’s names in conversation—
preferring to use various circumlocutions instead (much
like the senior male who dares not utter the bride’s name
at the delegation). Women were also somewhat removed
from the discussions occurring on the men’s side, which
meant that delegations and the associated negotiations
were always marked by a degree of “distributed cognition”
(Hutchins 1995).
The ritual of the delegation constitutes the formal pub-
lic recognition of the intent to marry; it masks the discrete
inquiries, the matchmaking work of senior women, and
heated negotiations over the size of the bridewealth, the
house, the wedding, and who knows what else. Ideally, the
delegation projects an image of familial cohesion crystal-
lized in the figure of the senior male: the sheikh, al-kabı¯r
(the big man), or wijeh al-jama¯‘a (the face of the group). If
one lingers after the pageantry has finished, though, crit-
icism of the sheikh, from nitpicking to outright denun-
ciation, will pour forth as family members point out the
various breakdowns. One father was eager to make clear to
me (the resident anthropologist) that he would have used
a different formula (sı¯gha) than the sheikh had but that
“he’s older so I couldn’t say anything.” At another ja¯ha, after
waiting hours for the groom’s family to show up and then
hearing their representatives’ long digressions about goats
before trying to renegotiate the bridewealth, the sheikh’s
nephew on the bride’s side seethed, “I would have spit in
their faces.” Beneath the delegation’s performance of the
family’s unity of purpose lies a host of conflicts and antag-
onisms that resist articulation at the moment but quickly
return once the ritual is finished. (See Figure 2.)
As Donald MacKenzie argues, it is necessary to avoid
“focusing exclusively on what one might call action’s
glamorous agential peaks” (2009:22). At first glance, the
delegation seems to work to bolster the position of the most
senior male. Further investigation makes it clear that many
people occupy that position only through an almost com-
plete surrender of self. The delegation distributes agency
and cognition but seems to have a hyperindividuating
effect on a handful of older male figures. But this effect
may belie the actual distribution of power within a given
community. In the ethnographic literature on Melanesia,
Roy Wagner has reexamined the classic anthropological
figure of the “big man.” The big man may ideally be “an
emperor of social friction who uses society against itself
to reinstate the essential individual at the top of the heap”
(1991:161), but Wagner argues that we must keep in mind
the possibility of a genealogical view of personhood in
which “person as human being and person as lineage or
clan are . . . different projections of its fractality” (1991:163).
Wagner enacts a figure–ground reversal in thinking about
the relationship between individual and society or col-
lective such that the big man alternately subsumes and is
subsumed by the group.
In keeping with Wagner’s observation, I found little ev-
idence outside the delimited bounds of the delegation that
the “sheikhs” who spoke, proffered coffee, and drank it were
more than projections of other agencies. A senior male had
no ability as a mere individual to find a suitable match for
younger relatives. As one father told me on the eve of his
son’s engagement, “She could be blind. She could have a
genetic disease. She could have bad morals. We had to ask
around a lot.” He explained that he had relied on the judg-
ment of his wife, who had found someone with the help of
her maternal aunt and her maternal aunt’s coworker. Given
the separation of the genders, such a surrender of self to the
judgment of the larger group and the consequent distribu-
tion of agency and cognition is practically inevitable.
This larger distribution of cognition and agency fits
with a pattern in which contemporary Jordanians some-
times define themselves relationally rather than as bear-
ers of distinctive and coherent identities.5 For instance,
adult Jordanians are often referred to as abu (father of)
and um (mother of) their eldest son. Rural Jordanians, in
particular, tend to refer constantly to their membership
in groups named after particular apical ancestors—from
each of whom buds a distinct shajirat al-‘a¯’ila (family tree).
Thus, personhood itself is distributed. For example, a fight
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Figure 2. The back of a 1920s-era marriage contract for the Emirate of Transjordan (Geoffrey Hughes).
between my neighbor Abu Fulan’s grandson and another
neighbor angry with the boy for peeping into his house was
described to me by the latter as “the problem with Abu Fu-
lan’s house.” Such a view of personhood both ratifies the
particular oral form of recognizing and legitimating mar-
riages described above and is in turn undergirded by its rit-
ual form. The notion of coherent kin groups and tribes with
potent leaders is dramatized through senior males acting
as the “faces of the groups,” their exchanges of words and
things, and the two opposing entourages with their mutual
meeting, greeting, shared commensality, and leave-taking.
What none of this particularly ratifies or undergirds are the
categories promoted by subsequent layers of legitimizing
infrastructure: “the individual,” “the state,” or “society.”
Discipline and subversion
In Jordan, the oral form of the delegation has increasingly
been supplemented by new, written forms of information
storage. These written forms exert an individuating in-
fluence on the husband and wife, clarify the terms of
marital agreements, enumerate the bridewealth, seek to
prevent the eruption of conflicts among families, and lay
the groundwork for new legitimizing infrastructures. As
Theodore Porter notes, “adequate measurement, clearly,
means disciplining people as well as standardizing instru-
ments and processes” (1995:28). People are increasingly
pressured to present themselves before particular au-
thorities and perform particular ritualistic acts to render
themselves recognizable in terms of a preset assortment
of categories. Yet such disciplining can also have what
the philosopher of science Ian Hacking calls “subversive
effects.” In his study of the history of statistics, Hacking ar-
gues that “enumeration demands kinds of things or people
to count. Counting is hungry for categories. Many of the
categories we now use are byproducts of the needs of enu-
meration” (1982:280). These new categories can become
morally charged in ways that threaten preexisting orders.
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They may even threaten the very attempts to discipline
people that created those categories in the first place.
A new kind of artifact—the written contract stored
in a government courthouse, which records a legally
enforceable alimony payment—has shifted the locus of
attention from the figure of the sheikh toward new social
actors like the wife, the husband, “the state” (ad-dawla),
and “society” (mujtama‘). The legitimizing infrastructures
of the contemporary Sharia Courts challenge the system
of delegations and wedding processions as they work to
reorganize Jordanian family life in terms of individualized
persons whose relations are legitimated by the state. Yet
such state-legitimated written marriage contracts remain
(as they have since pre-Islamic times) in productive tension
(cf. Shryock 1997) with their oral counterparts, with differ-
ent forms proving ascendant in various times and places.
Rather than narrate the development of these writ-
ten technologies for the legitimation of marriage as a
conscious program of a reified, preformed state acting in
relation to reified, preformed individuals, I find it more
useful to borrow Timothy Mitchell’s idea of the state as
an “effect” of “technical innovations of the modern social
order” (1991:77). It is, of course, tempting to “begin with
‘public officials forming their own policy preferences,’”
but this “starting point determines the nature of the state
as an originally subjective entity composed of individual
preferences, thoughts, decisions, and other ideational
phenomena,” or “a person writ large” (Mitchell 1991:83).
This view implies that perceptions of the state will develop
in dialectical relationship to extant notions of personhood.
Mitchell argues as much for the Euro-American case in
which political theorists, enamored with the idea that
“the possession of ideas and preferences” and being a
“self-formed and separate unit” (1991:83) is constitutive of
personhood, seek to draw a clear divide between the state
and society. Such autonomous agents and clear divisions,
however, are conspicuously absent within the legitimizing
infrastructure of marriage in Jordan.
Each written form of legitimizing infrastructure in-
volves a particular object, which serves as a tool for record
keeping: court registers, marriage contracts, and the statis-
tical report. These record-keeping tools can be analyzed as
what Matthew Hull has called, “graphic artifacts” that yield
distinct genres of bureaucratic communication, “each . . .
[with] its own pattern of use, distinct formal discursive char-
acteristics, orienting frameworks, interpretive procedures,
temporality, and sets of expectations through which read-
ers produce and make sense of it” (2003:292–293). This is
to say nothing of size, shape, and the ways they are allowed
to circulate. This perspective opens up space for thinking
about registers, marriage contracts, and contract data as ob-
jects that can operate in ways that are either orthogonal to
or opposed to the aims of their creators, calling cherished
notions of personhood, state, and society into question.
The court register
If it is important to recognize the oral contract as a contem-
porary phenomenon, it is equally important to recognize
the deep history of written contracts in the Middle East—
where the practice goes back to pre-Islamic times in major
regional urban centers.6 Most of what is now Jordan was ru-
ral and would have fallen outside the administrative con-
trol of the Ottoman courts until the appointment of the first
Sharia Court officials east of the Jordan River in Salt in 1867.
From the 16th to the 19th century, Palestinian courts (first
in Jerusalem and later in Gaza, Nablus, Jaffa, Lajun, and
Ramla) were theoretically responsible for their hinterlands,7
but going to the trouble of recording a marriage in those
far-off places must have seemed pointless to the rural pop-
ulation. By most accounts, the Ottomans could not even
prevent brigandage, tribal warfare, and extortion east of the
Jordan River—much less enforce marriage contracts (Rogan
1999; Shryock 1997). Nevertheless, those who made their
way to the Ottoman courts could have recorded their mar-
riage using a simple formula explaining that “so-and-so in
the presence of their legal agent (wakı¯l shira‘¯ı)” was present
for a marriage involving some amount of bridewealth or
alimony.
In contrast to the delegation, the court register is thor-
oughly individuating in ways that subvert the gerontocratic
authority structures of families—and even, potentially, the
courts and the state itself. The wife and husband are actu-
ally named along with their agents (family representatives
acting on their behalf) and witnesses. In addition to the
careful delineation of all relevant participants using individ-
ual names and even signatures, there are a number of new
and highly consequential actors, venues, and concepts: the
judge, the courthouse, and, increasingly, the abstract no-
tion of the state. As the delegation shows, a marriage con-
tract can be concluded with the two “sides” as the primary
guarantors and God serving as the final arbiter. The courts,
however, in their quest to measure, recognize, and legiti-
mate, first, the particulars of individual marriages and, later,
the reproductive life of the community as a whole, open
themselves up to unique challenges to their own legitimacy.
Such attempts to discipline people by assimilating them to
particular categories of person in relationship to the state
can even prove self-subverting when people refuse to be so
assimilated.
Residents of highly bureaucratized societies may as-
sume as a matter of course that a piece of paper could bring
the repressive powers of the state to bear on a recalcitrant
spouse—or forestall the imposition of those repressive
powers. In Jordan, these possibilities reflect a long period
of negotiation, as precedents have emerged for under-
standing the complex entailments of court documents. The
anthropologist, former intelligence officer, and sometime
opposition politician Dr. Ahmad Oweidi al-‘Abbadi offers
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one example of this process of negotiation in his doctoral
dissertation in giving an account of what happens when the
legitimizing infrastructure of the courts “breaks down.” He
describes how, during the summer of 1980, he was in the
governor’s office when a conflict arose over a young man (A)
who had impregnated a woman (B). She became pregnant
while she was still living in her father’s (C’s), house, after
she, the young man, and the father had signed the marriage
contract with the Sharia Courts but before the wedding and
bridewealth payment. The father was furious, but he had
been rebuffed by both the civil courts (who said it was a
Sharia matter) and the Sharia Courts (who maintained the
two were married). The governor intervened “to prevent
the dispute from getting out of hand” and convened an
impromptu arbitration session (including Dr. Ahmad),
which ruled:
although (A)’s action was theoretically legal, correct be-
havior is not to have intercourse with the fiance´e until
after a public wedding . . . Since (A) committed this act
secretly at (C’s) house, (A) must pay all the outstanding
[bridewealth] and should send a big jahah [i.e., ja¯ha]
to (C) and make a feast of conciliation, with food, con-
tributed by the notables of the two parties. He also had
to pay a fine of 300JD [Jordanian dinars] for hurmat al-
bayt [inviolability of the home] of (C). He was required
to swear an oath that he had not had sexual intercourse
with (B) before the marriage contract was signed, so as
to secure her and her sisters’ reputation, otherwise the
sisters’ chances of marriage would suffer because of his
action. (A) must take (B) to his house, as a wife, imme-
diately after the Jahah. [Al-‘Abbadi 2006:103]
A few things about this passage are striking. First, the state
bureaucracy appears uninterested until the matter rises to
the level of a threat to public security. Once activated, gov-
ernment officials are forced to contend with the gap be-
tween the “theoretically legal” and “correct behavior.” A
string of obligations and entailments involving various net-
works and groups of people emerge: the bridewealth, the
wedding, the father’s sense of entitlement to h. urmat al-
bayt, and the potentially negative impact on the sisters’
reputations. The outcome was determined not according
to Sharia but, rather, according to an explicitly traditional
framework, which relates these factors to the enactment of
nondocumentary as opposed to documentary rituals. When
faced with a potential riot by the bride’s outraged family,
the governor prioritized the wedding and the transfer of
bridewealth, not the paperwork or the Sharia-sanctioned
sexual prerogatives of the couple.
In 2012, the governor’s office continued to serve a key
role in solving problems for which the documentary proce-
dures of the courts were ill equipped. One of these is the
Islamic requirement that a virgin girl must have the per-
mission of her legal guardian (wa¯li ‘amr) to marry.8 When
permission was not forthcoming, young people would
sometimes go to the governor’s office to elope. According
to an employee in that office named Muhammed,
If you want zawa¯j shara‘¯ı [a Sharia marriage and a le-
gal, legitimate marriage], you need the permission of
the girl’s guardian. But sometimes, a boy and a girl run
away from their parents and they come to the office of
the governorate and the governor marries them to pre-
vent a tribal (‘asha’irı¯) conflict. Then they have to leave
and go live somewhere else. They’re married, but it’s
not an Islamic marriage.
When met with incredulity, Muhammed explained, “See,
she’s already been opened [lost her virginity]. Then they
come to us and we try to fix the problem before it widens.”
I asked how often this happened and Muhammed replied,
“It differs. We get more when the weather is hot. It warms
the blood . . . I’ll give you an annual rate: eight to ten per
year.” I replied, “Only in Madaba? What about other places
like Amman? It must be more, right?” Muhammed thought
for a second and said,
See, you have to remember that this is a tribal area.
Amman is different. It’s more like America with au-
tonomous families. In Amman and Zarqa, they have
different procedures. Normally, there, a girl will go
with a man for a while. Later she wants her rights and
she goes to the police and says he raped her. Then
it’s a case of rape (ightas. a¯b) and it’s a criminal case
and it has to be solved using criminal procedures.
Here if, God forbid, there was a rape, it would widen
quickly. The whole tribe would stand up. There would
be killing. So we have to solve the problem quickly. If a
girl disappears, they go to the police immediately. The
police come and they talk to her mother. Normally,
the mother knows who her lover is. The father doesn’t
know but the mother does. Then the police go and
find her lover. They bring him to the police station and
talk to him. Then we bring the two to the governor’s
and we marry them. It’s not a legal solution; it’s an
administrative solution. To give you an example: if,
God forbid, someone from [one tribe] khat.ifa (kid-
napped or eloped with) someone from [another tribe],
there would be tribal clashes. We would have to find
them quickly before the problem widened. Each area
is different with its own customs and traditions and so
the procedures of each governorate are different.9
In these cases of hurmat al-bayt, khat.ı¯fa, and ightis.a¯b,
tribesmen, governorate officials, and Sharia practitioners
take radically different positions on the various forms of
conflict and antagonism that arise between the generations
and the sexes. While each acknowledges the prerogative of
the older generation to exercise control of the sexual and
reproductive potential of younger generations, the Sharia
Courts and governorate attenuate these prerogatives by
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shifting the focus from the collective will of the tribe, the
sheikh, and the wakı¯l (agent) to individuals like the hus-
band, the wife, her mother, and the wife’s wa¯lı¯ (guardian).
The shift from wakı¯l to wa¯l¯ı is especially significant10
because the former is an amorphously defined senior male
while the latter is rigorously delimited as the closest adult
kinsman of the woman: her father; in his absence, her
brother; in his absence, her father’s brother, and so forth.
Yet, if this system of guardianship subverts the power of the
extended family, it endows the legally recognized guardian
with extra disciplinary prerogatives. It tacitly assumes that
the interests of the bride and her guardian are aligned. For
some, this definition of guardianship may prove an onerous
constraint, while, for others, it may provide unexpected
escape hatches.
Although the claims to authority latent within the court
register may prove self-subverting, the court register often
simply promises much more than it can actually deliver:
It is a single book with a hodgepodge of traces of differ-
ent legal procedures arranged in rough chronological order.
Far from a masterful tool of surveillance and technocratic
planning, a page from an Ottoman court register would
comprise rather sterile and repetitive formulas for record-
ing the negotiated settlements to a range of common con-
flicts. Land deals might be intermingled with a divorce here
or there or perhaps a “proof of legitimate agency.” Marriage
records were somewhat rare in the old court registers since
they were used mostly to preempt disputes or to record their
settlements.11
Despite the historically limited scope of Sharia Courts
in Jordan and the at times spectacular ways in which they
have been eclipsed by the governor’s office, in a larger sense
governmental procedures for the legitimation of marriage
have shifted decisively across the board toward accounting
for the wishes of the husband, the wife, and her guardian—
rather than the sheikh, the agent, and the tribe. Court-
issued contracts continue this trend.
Court-issued contracts
In the late 19th century, the Sharia Courts adopted more
complex procedures as part of the Tanzimat “reorgani-
zation” of the late Ottoman Empire—a major moderniz-
ing and Westernizing initiative that drew liberally from
the French Napoleonic model. By the turn of the century,
old court registers were supplemented by freely circulating
preprinted form contracts that were filled out by a new fig-
ure: the traveling itinerant notary, who extended the courts’
reach into rural areas.12 The British takeover after World
War I and the implementation of new procedures for the is-
suance of marriage contracts and the opening of the Am-
man courthouse in 1926 merely continued earlier trends.
Brinkley Messick’s The Calligraphic State (1993) tells a par-
allel story for Yemen, where successive waves of Ottoman
and then British colonization produced a “textual polity”
that remained in productive tension with the kinds of pol-
itics embodied in the delegation. In Messick’s account, like
mine, what makes Sharia distinctive from the delegation is
the specific manner in which the legitimacy of the contract
is constituted through its relationship to particular kinds of
face-to-face interactions. These interactions involve com-
plex practices for modulating presence and absence in
response to long-standing ideas about the divergence be-
tween real and ideal gendered and age-based power dy-
namics within families.
One of the most basic divergences between court pro-
cedure and the delegation is the requirement that particular
individuals be present in a fully embodied manner. Here,
the face, voice, and hands figure prominently. Messick’s
Yemeni case exaggerates some of the constitutive features
of my own ethnographic case. He describes the muwa¯jaha
(the unimpeded face-to-face encounter) as the primary
mode of governance in prerepublican Yemen. He contrasts
it with a genre of social criticism that turned on derivations
of the Arabic root h-j-b, with its connotations of seclusion,
concealment, and, of course, veiling (hija¯b) to critique
the tendency of rulers to grow distant from their subjects.
Messick contrasts “proper and just ‘masculine’ conduct . . .
enacted through the regular presentation of one’s face and
through the secure medium of speech” with a “feminine”
mode that “relies on the concealment of the face and works
through the dangerous medium of writing” (1993:173).
This gendered structural opposition of the masculine
seen and the feminine unseen also extended to types of
evidence. According to Hanafi legal manuals (which mirror
the gendered distribution of cognition described above
for the delegation), “contracts . . . conversion, witness
evaluation and death” were the purview of men, while
“female virginity, childbirth, menstruation, breast feeding,
and [female] physical defects under clothes” were part of
the domain of women (Messick 1993:180). What renders
a contract believable and admissible as evidence under
Islamic law is the recognition of how it emerges from an
agonistic and highly visible face-to-face encounter and
carries with it the undeniable indexical linkages of stamp,
fingerprint, handwriting, and signature. Such indexical
linkages connect the contract to the bodies of known
individuals and, by extension, the outward performance
of volitional acts by the various principals. Requiring this
constellation of hand, voice, and face in the production of
graphic artifacts practically ensures new forms of presence,
thereby creating spaces for new kinds of claims making as
well as new categories. (See Figure 3.)
This emphasis on presence in the making of contracts,
however, is not necessarily liberating. Indeed, the require-
ments of presence can create serious obstacles to those
hoping to marry. The most disturbing case I saw was that of
a Syrian bride trying to marry a Jordanian man and escape
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Figure 3. A contemporary Jordanian marriage contract (Geoffrey Hughes).
the civil war tearing her home country apart. The Syrian
embassy had sent her brother (her legal guardian) back
to Syria to collect some documents. While en route, he
was apprehended and held incommunicado. The groom
tried to smooth things over, initially telling the courthouse
officials that “her father is dead, her brother is in Syria,
but her cousin (father’s brother’s son) and mother are
here.” The officials were unmoved. “Would you let your
mother marry off your sister?” one snapped. The man
testily explained the situation and ended by pointing to the
(rather lanky) cousin in the hall: “They held that man for
one month! He was 100 kilos before!” Only after obtaining
written proof from the Ministry of the Interior confirming
that the woman had no male relatives from her immediate
family in the country could she be married—“in the name
of the court.” Mirroring the logic of the tribal delegation,
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families would often try to cover up the lack of a guardian
by multiplying relatives—as if a mother, two brothers, and a
father’s brother should make up for the lack of the guardian.
I never saw this gambit succeed.
Instead, those families hoping to legitimate a marriage
were expected to arrive with the groom, bride, her father,
two witnesses (optimally, one from each “side”), ID cards,
the family notebooks for the two sides, the results of med-
ical tests for genetic risk factors, and a marriage request
form from the storeroom on the first floor. Assuming a
relatively standard marriage involving a virgin over the age
of 18 marrying a man with no other wives, there was no
need to gain the permission of a judge or to have a clerk
write out special letters. Applicants would go to the office
of the head of writing (ra’¯ıs al-kuta¯b) where a sheikh (in
the religious, not tribal, sense) was ready to officiate. I
observed numerous such sessions. The sheikh would sit
in the far left of the room behind his desk and computer
while I would sit to his right with the families facing us
on a set of armless pleather chairs. I would introduce
myself, explain that I was studying marriage, and ask if I
could observe. No one ever objected.13 The sheikh would
begin by filling out an elicitation form, which a clerk would
later painstakingly hand copy onto the actual contracts.
The documents themselves provided most of the relevant
personal information (name, age, place of birth, place of
residency, marital status, occupation, national ID number),
but the sheikh would usually double-check. The most
delicate subject was the couple’s “social status.” The sheikh
would ask, “Have you been engaged?” If not, the man would
be classified as a (celibate) bachelor (‘azb) and the woman
would be classified as a virgin (bikr). If one of them had
been engaged, it was up to court officials to determine if
the person was currently married (in the case of a man),
widowed, divorced, or divorced before consummation.
With the basics out of the way, the sheikh would
ask that the door be closed so he could begin the pro-
ceedings in earnest. He would usually ask the woman
if she consented to the marriage, following the initial
“Do you agree?” with increasingly pointed formulations:
“No one is coercing you?” “You’re not being required to
do this?” “You’re sure?” If there was a large age differ-
ence, the man had another wife, or the woman was still in
school, the sheikh would raise these points as possible ob-
jections that the bride might have. Next, the sheikh would
ask about bridewealth and requirements—making sure to
note whether the bridewealth had been received. Then,
the sheikh would instruct the bride, groom, witnesses, and
guardian to sign the relevant forms, including the sheet
for eliciting the details of the contract (blue ink) and the
three copies of the official contract (black ink): one for the
woman’s side, one for the man’s side, and a “permanent
copy” that would remain in the courthouse.
Following the signing, the sheikh would quote a verse
from the Quran (30:21). “In the name of God the compas-
sionate and the merciful: ‘And of His signs is that He cre-
ated for you from yourselves spouses that you may find
tranquility in them; and He placed between you affection
and mercy. Indeed in that are signs for a people who give
thought’ (trust in Almighty God).” The sheikh would then
transition to a popular hadith: “And the messenger of God
(peace be upon him) said, ‘A woman is normally sought
as a wife for her lineage, wealth, beauty, or religiousness,
but choose a religious woman and you will prosper.’” He
would then ask the groom to take the hand of the bride’s
father. The sheikh would ask the bride’s father to repeat, “I
married you, my son [so-and-so], to my [virgin] daughter
[so-and-so] for the agreed upon bridewealth and accord-
ing to the book of God and the practices of God’s messen-
ger (peace be upon him).” Then the groom would be asked
to repeat, “And I married your [virgin] daughter [so-and-
so] for the agreed upon bridewealth and according to the
book of God and the practices of God’s messenger (peace
be upon him).” With that, the sheikh and I would congrat-
ulate the men and shake their hands. The sheikh would tell
the groom, “A thousand congratulations! Remember today’s
date: the date you cast off celibacy.” He would ask the cou-
ple if they prayed. Normally, the bride would say yes, and
the groom would stammer out some sort of excuse. Sheikh
Salameh (the notary with whom I worked most closely)
would chastise the young man by referring to a popular ha-
dith teaching that “marriage is half of religion but prayer is
the other half” before smiling, turning to the bride, and in-
structing her, “You need to buy a whip and get him up every
morning for the dawn prayer.” As a final admonition, the
sheikh would warn the pair that they were now married and
that they should beware of divorce. He would explain that
the contracts would be available for pickup the next week
and then instruct them to pay a 35-dinar fee “for the state”
(lil-dawla) and “whatever you want” for the employees.
The insistence on physical presence and face-to-face
encounter is tied to particular assumptions about power re-
lations and constellations of interest within the family. I was
told stories “from long ago” of families who dealt with a re-
luctant bride by having a sister impersonate her recalcitrant
sibling from behind a door or screen to fool the ma’dhu¯n
into believing the bride had consented. Such breakdowns
emphasized that Sharia (like any legal system) must operate
at the level of surface facts (the seen) while refusing to delve
deeply into motives, intent, and the subtleties of indirect
speech. Even contracts conducted in homes, however, now
require indexical signs of the woman’s consent that show
she was involved in the muwa¯jaha (face-to-face encounter).
When I turned up evidence of early contracts on which the
“signatures” were all in the ma’dhu¯n’s handwriting, contem-
porary judges were appalled; such has been the apparent
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shift in sensibilities. This was at the heart of Judge Salameh’s
repeated insistence that women loudly declare their inten-
tions in contravention of other gendered ideals of feminine
comportment, including his frequent entreaty to the bride,
“Raise your voice, my sister.”
If presence is intimately connected to the validity of
the contract, so too are the conditions of its storage. That
three copies of the contract were made, one for each side
and a “permanent copy” to be held by the court, renders
the documents more convincing as evidence. As the fol-
lowing ethnographic example of a breakdown illustrates,
however, both employees and applicants of the court were
quite nuanced in their appraisals of putative evidence. One
day, two women (a mother and daughter) walked into Judge
Hussein’s office. The daughter began, “There was a famil-
ial problem and they [the family] divorced me.” Hussein
replied, “Ignore it” (la tiruddı¯: lit. “don’t respond”). He then
began to ask a series of questions to settle certain matters of
fact while trying to put their minds at ease:
Hussein: Is there consummation (dukhu¯l)?
Women: Yeah.
H: Is there pregnancy?
W: No.
H: What does your husband say?
Mother: He didn’t say anything. But he only responds to
his father.
H: Ignore it. Did you marry his father?
W (smiling): No.
H: Then ignore it. What’s the bridewealth?
M: You had 3,000 upfront and 5,000 delayed.
H: And you received it?
Daughter: No. I didn’t receive anything. Even the clothes!
H: If he divorced you, all of that is on his head.
M: But there are connections (wast. a¯t) . . . Can you make
sure he hasn’t already divorced her?
H: No, Hajji. There aren’t any connections. That’s impossi-
ble. No one can be divorced without knowing it.
D: I’m military. Thank God nobody is coercing me [to
marry] (yaghas. ibnı¯), but I have been engaged before—I
divorced before consummation.
H: Don’t be afraid. If you’re a lawful woman and a daughter
of the people, don’t be afraid.
D: How am I going to get my possessions?
H: Ask. And if he doesn’t respond bring the police.
M: That will destroy everything. There’s nothing without
connections . . .
H: What’s his name?
M: ———— .
H: Oh. His relatives are [clerks]. Don’t respond. The judge
won’t respond to him. The judge only listens to the two
partners.
M: But connections!
H: He’s just a clerk. Don’t be afraid of talk like that . . .
The facts of the case are opaque, but my concern here is
only with their social recognition. Specifically, a woman
soldier is able to use the courts to assert her right to her
bridewealth (should her father-in-law pursue divorce) and
extract personal assurances from the judge that her hus-
band’s relatives will be punished should they interfere. Af-
ter she left, Hussein took the unusual step of talking to
the man’s relatives about how, “with all of these corrup-
tion investigations,” they should be careful should they
choose to involve themselves in this matter. Despite the ac-
knowledgment of such potential weak links in the chain of
authentication, contracts are stored in bound books and
numbered—making them difficult to remove or replace.
Handwriting is distinctive. It would certainly raise suspi-
cions if different copies of the same contract were found to
have been written in different hands or if they had signa-
tures or thumbprints that looked markedly different from
one another or if the signatures and thumbprints of the di-
vorce paperwork were different from those of the marriage
contracts.
More striking than the possibility of forgery, however,
is the notion that the contract can be understood as false
in a certain sense (in this case, because the contract claims
the bridewealth has been paid, when it in fact has not
been) yet still fundamentally valid. Once again, assump-
tions about the legitimacy of documents in Islamic law
are conditional on how they emerge from face-to-face en-
counters. So, while a contract might be taken as sufficient
proof of marriage (assuming no obvious signs of forgery),
the particulars or the payment of bridewealth might not be
taken at face value. Nor will acceptance that the bridewealth
was never paid invalidate the contract. Such moves would
be seen as an unacceptable abridgement of the woman’s
prerogatives—no doubt compounding the oppression she
suffered in being denied her bridewealth in the first place.
The contemporary system of Sharia in Jordan is deeply
concerned with establishing particular kinds of evidence
of the agreement of individuals within a particular interac-
tional context and then registering that consent via indexi-
cal linkages that connect a document to the bodies of those
present when it was drawn up. The system then relies on
the ability to securely store such documents and prevent
their manipulation by instrumentalizing the assumed di-
vergence of interests between the two “sides.” Ideally, these
practices and considerations produce a self-policing sys-
tem in which neither the bride’s nor the groom’s side can
alter the document without the other crying foul and im-
mediately presenting compelling evidence to back up the
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accusation of forgery. They are part of a complex and at
times cynical set of assumptions developed by Sharia prac-
titioners about generational and gendered conflict within
families.
At the same time that the Sharia Courts have sought
to alleviate social tensions, promote certain standards of
behavior, and fight oppression, they have had other, more
subversive effects. Even something as simple as a court
register individuates at the same time that it produces a
“state effect.” But, while the state may be seen as present
and surveilling in the form of the functionaries and court-
house building, it is also largely inscrutable. It collects in-
formation more readily than it distributes it. Society (as
distinct from tribe or confessional community) is know-
able primarily through the state’s putative attempts at
observation and regulation, and it is thinkable largely in re-
lationship to the court’s jurisdiction. The circulating con-
tract exaggerates all of these tendencies: Signatures and
thumbprints are eventually demanded of individualized
participants. The state effect is now no longer just a pres-
ence in the form of a court edifice and employees. Now,
the state is a certifying entity that promotes particular cate-
gories of relationship and even begins to open these up for
observation as its graphic artifacts come to circulate widely.
Society in turn has a more standardized descriptive vocab-
ulary of itself.
Aggregated contract data
When contract data are aggregated, personhood is fully
individuated and anonymous. In a certain sense, it can
disappear entirely. The level of abstraction is extreme:
People are no longer identified in relation to a guardian or
agent or even a family name. The state is both observing
and observed. Most interestingly, it is potentially account-
able. Publishing a marriage rate or divorce rate encourages
people to think about what the optimum rate might be.
The complement of the state’s greater level of definition
is the increasing clarity with which people can imagine
“society” as a quantifiable object that, like the state, could
potentially be held to account. Legitimizing infrastructures
sometimes reify the idea of the state–society divide but may
also provide the tools to undermine and transform it. The
impulse for enumeration and the attendant legitimizing in-
frastructures have slowly enmeshed the Sharia Courts, the
Jordanian state, and something we can only call “Jordanian
society” within a system of accountability not fully of their
own devising.
The Chastity Society, the Islamic charity with which
this article began, epitomizes this tendency to elaborate a
system of accountability and legitimacy that overwhelms
the intentions of its authors. Founded in 1993, the society
has built a prolific publishing enterprise using the Sharia
Courts’ Annual Statistical Report to critique the regime. I
focus here on how the society’s pamphlets use statistics
available since 1995 to make political demands on behalf
of two novel categories: the spinster (‘a¯nis) and the woman
divorced before consummation (mut.alaqa qabl al-dakhu¯l).
While the Chastity Society takes statistics from a wide range
of sources, including the Jordanian Department of Statis-
tics, the United Nations, and the Sharia Courts of neighbor-
ing countries, its intellectuals tend to foreground statistics
that highlight the Sharia Courts’ own system of record keep-
ing, like the annual number of marriage contracts signed in
Jordan. ‘Adal Badraneh’s The Guide: Indicators of Marriage
and Divorce in Jordan is typical (2009). What he terms the
“First Indicator” is the “General Rate of Marriage,” which he
calculates using the formula: 1,000 x the Number of Mar-
riage Contracts in a Particular Year/Population in the Same
Year (Badraneh 2009:31). In the early years of the Chastity
Society, the figures were quite compelling: The first table in
Faruq Badran and Mufid Sarhan’s Spinsterhood: The Reality,
the Causes and the Solutions (1999) details a secular decline
from a rate of 10.1 marriages per year per 1,000 people in
1993 to 8.1 in 1998. By 2009, when The Guide was published,
the rate of marriage contracts was increasing, yet it still
took pride of place as the first indicator of the “marriage
crisis.”
That intellectuals from the Chastity Society continued
to foreground the number of marriage contracts long after
it ceased to bolster their argument calls into question a
simple reading of their appropriation of official statistics as
opportunistic. Rather than “Islam,” “the Muslim Brother-
hood,” “tribes,” and “the state” opportunistically exploiting
conflict between the generations and the sexes (see
Wiktorowicz and Farouki 2000), these conflicts actually
help to define the contours of these highly abstracted
political forces. Building on the much earlier work of Ju¨rgen
Habermas (1991), Michael Warner (2002) has used the
concepts of “public” and “counterpublic” to describe how
media circulation can help construct communities and
generate their alternative forms. Jordanian marriage con-
tracts move in a similarly constructive and unsettling way:
The circulation of contracts and their diverse roles in differ-
ent forms of social conflict help to constitute categories that
prove destabilizing as communities form around them and
begin to formulate demands. It could further be argued that
quantifying media like contracts can help create such com-
munities precisely because they entail what Porter termed
“disciplining people.” The point of Badraneh’s study is to
understand “the effect of economic and social factors”
(2009:36). Yet without the disciplined collection of data by
the courts and similar institutions, it would be much more
difficult to argue for the existence of a coherent “economy”
and “society” that should be refashioned in accordance
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with a specific political agenda. When such ongoing and
lively disputes emerge around official statistics, the system-
atic collection of data about the population comes to serve
a coordinating function for regime apologists, potential
dissidents, political opportunists, and malcontents alike.
One should not, however, overplay the tensions be-
tween Islamic activists and the state. After all, the courts
keep publishing reports knowing they will be used to criti-
cize the state. Much as the proliferation of categories can be
used to critique the Jordanian state, they can also be used
to admonish and correct Jordanian society. This is exem-
plified by another strain of social criticism, centered on a
category that has emerged out of the courts’ own knowl-
edge practices: the person divorced before the consumma-
tion of the marriage. “Divorce before consummation,” a
new and growing category, accounted for over 40 percent
of the total divorces in 2010. In recent years, the courts’
Annual Statistical Report (2010) has included a breakdown
of divorces into four categories: divorce before consumma-
tion, revocable divorce, and two levels of irrevocable di-
vorce. Two trends are striking: the increasing prevalence of
divorce (from 12,000 per year in 2006 to 15,000 per year in
2010) and the increasing precision with which people’s “so-
cial statuses” are being recorded and taken up as sociolog-
ical categories by activists and relatively apolitical citizens
alike (Sharia Courts 2010:100).14
One example of this strain of social criticism is Amal
‘Abdeen’s master’s thesis at Jordan’s Amman Arab Uni-
versity, later revised for and published by the Chastity
Society as Divorce before Consummation and in the First
Year of Marriage: Social and Psychological Causes and
Effects (2010). Her study, carried out, ‘Abdeen makes clear,
because of the support of the supreme judge of the courts,
surveyed 50 women divorced before consummation and
50 women divorced in the first year. According to ‘Abdeen,
“the findings indicate that the most important reason for
divorce among the divorced is a bad match, followed by
familial interference, then failure to bear responsibility,
followed by subordination of the husband to his mother or
another member of his family” (2010:17). This diagnosis of
“the problem” of divorce before consummation in Jordan
is certainly debatable,15 but it is part and parcel of a kind
of contestation that has only become possible through a
long-term engagement with particular kinds of knowledge
practices for enumeration, individuation, and data storage.
The Islamic Movement may try to position itself as a critical
interlocutor vis-a`-vis the state, but it also seeks to position
itself as a critic of society in general. For her part, ‘Abdeen
ultimately advocates “consciousness-raising” (taw‘¯ıya)
through the media and the relevant ministries, including
more “guidance for willing individuals” from the courts
“before the case gets to the Judge,” and, of course, more
research (2010:152).
Conclusion
The four successive layers of information infrastructure
related to the recognition and legitimation of marriage (del-
egation, register, form contract, and aggregated contract
data) entail divergent and even contradictory notions of
personhood, state, and society. They represent creative re-
sponses to various threats to the legitimacy of marriages—
many of which predate the Jordanian state itself. As I have
shown, Muslim court functionaries and activists like ‘Ab-
deen make critiques (about bad matches, tyrannical elders,
an overbearing community, and a pronounced lack concern
over young people’s self-actualization) that speak to long-
standing conflicts between generations and the sexes. Yet
how those sentiments are constructed and disseminated
through a sophisticated back-and-forth dialogue among
families, individuals, the state, and society increasingly
involves contradictory constructions of the “individual.”
These constructions can range from the complete erasure
of individual identity in the statistical reports of the courts
to intense concern over questions of individual consent
during contract signings. Everyone from patriarchs to
rebellious youths and state officials may find their behavior
alternately constrained and enabled by court procedures.
“Society” in tribal and urban areas may not only respond
to premarital sex or other issues in entirely different ways
but may also force “the state” to respond differently. The
very mechanisms through which the state attempts to hold
tribes and individual citizens accountable may give them
tools for holding the state and its representatives account-
able. The issue is therefore not a simple matter of discipline
or subversion. Rather, the two emerge as reverse sides of
the same state-building, infrastructure-building project. At
stake is the ability of various social actors to redistribute
agency, cognition, and personhood both within and out-
side kinship structures, the state, and society. Legitimizing
infrastructures make new modes of independence possible.
They promise new modes of authority and surveillance.
Nonetheless, state officials and other authority figures
may very well find that developing and co-opting these
infrastructures can draw their own legitimacy into question.
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Errors, of course, are mine alone.
1. While the sajila¯t (registers) and contracts are a tantalizing
source of data for social history, historians such as Dror Ze’evi,
Judith Tucker, and Annelies Moors (1999) have argued forcefully for
the need to read such records contextually. As Ze’evi argues, the
sajila¯t are, in fact, “carefully constructed legal narratives in which
the legal aspect, although invisible to the reader, is still the essence
of the record” (1998:38). Ze’evi explores some of the problems with
various methodologies for studying contracts. Quantitative meth-
ods are problematic because we have no way of knowing what
kind of sampling of the larger population they provide. Most im-
portantly, numbers like bridewealth and age may be systematically
distorted by public perceptions of what court officials want to hear.
The use of court records to construct narrative history is at least
as problematic. Like a Rorschach test, disjointed bits of informa-
tion verily cry out for narration, yet such a process may reveal more
about the narrator than about change over time. I have tried to min-
imize these problems by using a mixed-methods approach.
2. Ottoman court registers are not nearly as amenable to statisti-
cal or other forms of systematic analysis—itself a significant finding
that may shed light on subsequent technical innovations.
3. Here I use a sort of “ritual subjunctive” tense as opposed to,
say, the ethnographic present (Fabian 1983) to emphasize the ide-
alized nature of the description.
4. It is useful to compare this form of marriage delegation to
the delegations described by Jessica Watkins’s (2014) recent work
on tribal dispute resolution in Jordan. Parallels include everything
from the ritually significant use of coffee to the spatial dynamics
of the two “sides” and the prominent role of sheikhs. The marriage
delegation is undergirded by a not-too-subtle threat that it could
be reconstituted to settle a dispute should the marriage end badly.
With the exception of the reading of the Quran, there is nothing
particularly Islamic about the ritual described, and contemporary
Jordanian Christians employ similar marital rites.
5. In “Intimate Selving” (1999), Suad Joseph gives a broader illus-
tration of this phenomenon on the basis of fieldwork conducted in
Beirut.
6. The historian Amira Sonbol (2008) has conducted extensive
archival work on marriage contracts in the Nile delta going back to
the 14th century B.C.E. She documents the ways women in what
is now Egypt were treated as legal persons. Although she makes a
convincing case that the introduction of French legal theories, both
through direct colonial rule under Napoleon and later indirectly
via the Ottoman Empire’s Tanzimat reforms, weakened the status
of women in the region, Lynn Welchman’s (1988) review of the
Jordanian Law of Personal Status shows that Jordan never adopted
most of the colonial-era practices that Sonbol critiques. Egyptian
law came to restrict the use of requirements in contracts and man-
date wifely obedience. In Jordan, requirements are not only allowed
but also have a dedicated space on the contract form, and ideals of
female “obedience” (t. a¯‘a) are unenforceable.
7. While the Ottoman era courts in Syria and Palestine were
some of the most marginal to the empire, Judith Tucker (1998:21)
emphasizes the shared Hanafi jurisprudential framework, exten-
sive regional trade, the circulation of (often Turkish-speaking)
judges throughout the empire, and the fact that even relatively
provincial Palestinian religious scholars studied in Mecca, Cairo,
and Damascus.
8. In the everyday conversation of court officials, “virgin,”
“never-married woman,” and “girl” were synonymous. The four
schools of Islamic jurisprudence diverge, though, on whether these
categories entail different prerogatives in court and the degree to
which they should be conflated: Malikis and Shafi‘is (like contem-
porary court officials) require the male guardian’s consent for all
first marriages, while the Hanafi school allows women to marry
on their own behalf once they have reached majority (Sonbol
2008:103).
9. There is a need for more ethnographic research about
khat.ifa and ightis.a¯b. As Cynthia Werner’s ethnographic work in
Central Asia shows, “a number of ambiguities make it difficult to
determine whether or not a kidnapping case is ‘consensual’ or
‘nonconsensual’” (2004:82). Currently in Jordan, there is growing
controversy about Article 308, which allows an accused rapist to
avoid prison by marrying the woman. While some women’s groups
are now organizing to change the law, others argue that a change
will take away women’s ability to lose their virginity to force their
parents to accept a match they would otherwise oppose (Hattar
2012).
10. The change in court procedures is starker than the shift in
families’ behavior. My sample of 377 contracts from the Amman
courthouse (1926–53) shows that agents were usually what would
now be considered guardians: over half of brides’ agents were fa-
thers. Furthermore, given the low life expectancies of the era, some
portion of the following agents must have been guardians in the
contemporary sense: 21 percent were brothers of the bride, 8 per-
cent were father’s brothers, 1 percent were grandfathers, and 1 per-
cent were father’s brother’s sons. In 17 cases, the bride represented
herself, and in five cases she represented herself alongside her fa-
ther or brother acting in some sort of guarantor capacity. Yet there
is a sizable minority of contracts in which the agent clearly diverges
from the guardian. In 11 percent of contracts, I can discern no
relationship between the bride and her agent even though every
Arab name includes the names of the person’s father and grandfa-
ther along with a family name. Additionally, two contracts list the
ma’dhu¯n as the agent and six list the mother’s brother—neither of
which has ever had any particular standing in Islamic law. Even
when the agent is listed as a relative through the patriline, there are
clear examples of the father appearing in the contract as receiver
of the bridewealth but not as the agent. Although the bride’s role as
an active agent in the contract process was actively muted by the
state’s contemporary documentary procedures, 88 percent of the
grooms acted as their own agent.
11. Tucker (1998:191) notes that only 107 marriages were
recorded in the town of Nablus (population 8,000) between 1720
and 1858, demonstrating that even most urbanites did not register
their marriages at court.
12. There is a movement of Jordanian court activities away from
homes to officially sanctioned, single-use spaces (courts) in keep-
ing with a broader trend toward the development of a Weberian di-
vision between person and office. My own sample showed that only
four contracts were concluded at the Madaba courthouse before
1978, while about 30–40 percent have been concluded there since
the 1980s.
13. People did, however, have interesting theories about why I
was there, for instance, that I was a “supervisor from the U.S. em-
bassy.” I responded, as I always did, that I was a researcher who
thought Americans could learn from Islamic marriage practices.
14. Despite the lack of an actual field for social status until
the 1952 revision of the contracts, my sample from the Amman
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courthouse includes only 13 contracts that omitted information on
this topic. Two hundred seventy brides are classified as virgin (bikr),
and 78 are classified as previously married (thayyib). Nine are clas-
sified with euphemistic circumlocutions like “girl,” “woman,” or
“woman of the house.” In the sample of 377 contracts, only five
women are classified as divorce´es, and only one woman is classified
as a widow: These terms came into regular use only in the 1950s. Of
433 contracts I collected that postdate 1955, “divorced before con-
summation” does not appear until 1998—after which it makes 13
appearances.
15. In contrast, Salem 2012 analyzes divorce before consumma-
tion as a way for young people to exercise more independence.
References cited
‘Abdeen, Amal
2010 Divorce before Consummation and in the First Year
of Marriage: Social and Psychological Causes and Effects
[At.-tala¯q qabl al-dakhu¯l wa f¯ı as-sinna al-owla min al-zawa¯j:
Al-asba¯b wa al-itha¯r al-nafsiyya wa al-ijtima¯‘iyya]. Amman,
Jordan: Chastity Society.
Al-‘Abbadi, Ahmad Oweidi
2006 Bedouin Justice: The Customary Legal System of the Tribes
and Its Integration into the Framework of State Polity from
1921–1982. Amman, Jordan: Dar Jareer.
Badran, Faruq, and Mufid Sarhan
1999 Spinsterhood: The Reality, the Causes and the Solutions
[Al-‘anu¯siyya: -Al-wa¯qa‘ -al-asba¯b -al-halu¯l]. Amman, Jordan:
Al-‘Afaaf.
Badraneh, ‘Adal
2009 The Guide: Indicators of Marriage and Divorce in Jordan
[Al-dal¯ıl: Mu‘shra¯t al-zawa¯j wa at.-t.ala¯q f¯ı Al-Ordan]. Amman,
Jordan: Al-‘Afaaf.
Clarke, Morgan
2009 Islam and New Kinship: Reproductive Technology and the
Sharia in Lebanon. New York: Berghahn Books.
Fabian, Johannes
1983 Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object.
New York: Columbia University Press.
Habermas, Ju¨rgen
1991[1962] The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere:
An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. Thomas
Burger, trans. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Hacking, Ian
1982 Biopower and the Avalanche of Printed Numbers. Humani-
ties in Society 5:279–295.
Hasso, Frances
2011 Consuming Desires: Family Crisis and the State in the Mid-
dle East. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Hattar, Musa
2012 “Rape Law” Triggers Fury in Jordan. Agence France-Presse.
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2012/Jun-
28/178574-rape-law-triggers-fury-in-jordan.ashx, accessed
February 6, 2015.
Hull, Matthew
2003 The File: Agency, Authority, and Autography in an Islam-
abad Bureaucracy. Language Communication 23(3–4):287–
314.
Hutchins, Ed
1995 How a Cockpit Remembers Its Speeds. Cognitive Science
19:265–288.
Joseph, Suad
1999 Intimate Selving in Arab Families: Gender, Self, and Identity.
Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
MacKenzie, Donald
2009 Material Markets: How Economic Agents Are Constructed.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Messick, Brinkley
1993 The Calligraphic State: Textual Domination and History in a
Muslim Society. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Mitchell, Timothy
1991 The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and
Their Critics. American Political Science Review 85(1):77–96.
Moors, Annelies
1999 Debating Islamic Family Law: Legal Texts and Social Prac-
tices. In A Social History of Women and Gender in the Mod-
ern Middle East. Margaret Meriwether and Judith Tucker, eds.
Pp. 141–175. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Ong, Walter
1982 Orality and Literacy. London: Methuen.
Porter, Theodore
1995 Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and
Public Life. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Rogan, Eugene
1999 Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire: Transjor-
dan, 1850–1921. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Salem, Rania
2012 Trends and Differentials in Jordanian Marriage Behavior:
Marriage Timing, Spousal Characteristics, Household Struc-
ture and Matrimonial Expenditures. Working Paper, 668. Giza,
Egypt: Economic Research Forum.
Sharia Courts
2010 Annual Statistical Report [At-taqrı¯r al-ih. sa¯‘¯ı as-sinawı¯].
Amman, Jordan: Sharia Courts.
Shryock, Andrew
1997 Nationalism and the Genealogical Imagination: Oral His-
tory and Textual Authority in Tribal Jordan. Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press.
Sonbol, Amira
2008 A History of Marriage Contracts in Egypt. In The Islamic
Marriage Contract: Case Studies in Islamic Family Law. Frank
Vogel and Asifa Quraishi, eds. Pp. 87–122. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Star, Susan Leigh
1999 The Ethnography of Infrastructure. American Behavioral
Scientist 43(3):377–391.
Tucker, Judith
1998 In the House of the Law: Gender and Islamic Law in Ot-
toman Syria and Palestine. Berkeley: University of California
Press.
Wagner, Roy
1991 The Fractal Person. In Big Men and Great Men: Personifi-
cations of Power in Melanesia. Maurice Godelier and Marilyn
Strathern, eds. Pp. 159–173. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Warner, Michael
2002 Publics and Counterpublics. Public Culture 14(1):49–90.
Watkins, Jessica
2014 Seeking Justice: Tribal Dispute Resolution and Societal
Transformation in Jordan. International Journal of Middle East
Studies 46(1):31–49.
Welchman, Lynn
1988 The Development of Islamic Family Law in the Legal Sys-
tem of Jordan. International and Comparative Law Quarterly
37(4):868–896.
Werner, Cynthia
2004 Women, Marriage, and the Nation-State: The Rise of
Nonconsensual Bride Kidnapping in Post-Soviet Kazakhstan.
In The Transformation of Central Asia: States and Societies
293
American Ethnologist  Volume 42 Number 2 May 2015
from Soviet Rule to Independence. Pauline Jones Luong, ed.
Pp. 59–89. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Wiktorowicz, Quintan, and Suha Taji Farouki
2000 Islamic NGOs and Muslim Politics: A Case from Jordan.
Third World Quarterly 21(4):685–699.
Ze’evi, Dror
1998 The Use of Ottoman Sharı¯‘a Court Records as a Source for
Middle Eastern Social History: A Reappraisal. Islamic Law and
Society 5(1):35–56.
Geoffrey Hughes
Department of Anthropology
University of Michigan
101 West Hall
1085 South University Ave.
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1107
gfhugh@umich.edu
294
